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Abstract  
This contribution to the debate on the challenges to comparative politics largely focuses 
on the issue of differences versus similarities, the issue that has been raised by both 
authors: Caramani and Van Kersbergen. I share their concern that too much research 
focuses on differences between countries and I also join them in locating the sources of 
this bias in methodological considerations. I do not agree however with some of 
Caramani’s points, in particular his fundamental claim that explanation necessarily 
demands variations across cases; a claim that seems also to be made at least implicitly by 
Van Kersbergen. I argue that the validity of an explanation rather depends on the degree 
to which empirical evidence is congruent with observable implications of this explanation 
and is not congruent with implications of rival explanations. It is irrelevant whether these 
theoretical expectations concern differences or similarities between countries.  I therefore 
advocate a theory-driven rather than a case-driven analysis of national political systems 
in order to meet the challenge to explain similarities between them.  
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INTRODUCTION 
The articles by Caramani and Van Kersbergen have raised topical issues that should 
disturb everyone investigating national political systems. Caramani claims that 
comparative politics is biased towards focusing on differences between countries rather 
than on similarities and that this is an unfortunate development. Van Kersbergen shares 
this view. In addition van Kersbergen claims that in our times scholars in comparative 
politics neglect the societal sources of politics and power, ‘politics as dependent 
variable’, focusing to much on explaining policy outputs and outcomes, ‘politics as 
independent variable’. He also claims that scholars too easily give up central concepts in 
comparative politics, such as ‘the state’. The latter two points of Van Kersbergen are 
thought provoking and certainly worth discussing. However in this contribution, I will 
focus on the theme that is probably most important for this EPS discussion, if only 
because it is addressed by both authors: explaining differences and variations versus 
explaining similarities. 
 
 
A BIAS TOWARDS STUDYING DIFFERENCES AND VARIATION?  
Van Kersbergen and Caramani detect a bias towards a focus on differences rather than 
similarities. Caramani writes: ‘While many definitions of comparative politics as a 
discipline stress the symmetry between differences and (emphasis Caramani) similarities, 
the tendency in comparative empirical research has been to privilege the former while 
neglecting the latter’ (Caramani ms p. 3). He argues that such an asymmetry is inadequate 
to understand current developments in world politics, pointing to interdependence and 
diffusion effects stirred by integration and globalization.  
In the same vein, Van Kersbergen speaks of a ‘preoccupation with variation’ (Van 
Kersbergen ms p. 8). He illustrates this claim by a survey of articles of an 2005 issue of 
the European Journal of Political Research, and a 2005 issue of West European Politics, 
in which with one exception all puzzles are framed in terms of differences and variation. 
Like Caramani, he is very critical of this development. He notes that what is often 
puzzling in current politics is that of political phenomena happening ‘at the same time’ 
and ‘everywhere’ (Van Kersbergen ms p. 11). He refers to the phenomena of political 
 2
disaffection which hits all well- established democracies. He concludes this section of his 
paper with ‘If the pressure to deal with problems of variation only is such that such 
puzzles of similarities can no longer be raised legitimately then this is a tragedy for 
comparative politics’ (Van Kersbergen ms. p. 11). 
Although I have not systematically researched this question, I tend to agree with 
both authors that there is a bias in comparative politics towards explaining differences 
between countries. It is my impression that puzzles are framed in terms of differences and 
variations rather than similarities.1 I also share their view that this is unfortunate. Many 
important developments in politics take the form of (growing) similarities and the 
example of political disaffection given by van Kersbergen is a telling one. I also agree 
with Caramani that globalization and political integration may nurture diffusion and 
interdependency effects and that therefore issues of similarities and convergence should 
merit more scholarly attention (see also Haverland, 2007). 
 
METHOD TRUMPS SUBSTANCE?  
Both authors argue that this bias towards differences and variation is due to 
methodological considerations. It is a side effect of political science ‘maturing’ into a 
‘scientific’ discipline (Van Kersbergen ms. p.9). Caramani elaborates on this by writing 
that comparative politics bases its explanatory potential on variation: variation ‘is at the 
basis of all social science methods – experimental, quasi-experimental or non-
experimental – whether using qualitative or quantitative data’ (Caramani ms. p. 5-6). 
Again, I do agree with both authors that this bias is largely method-driven. Mainstream 
comparative politics engages the comparison between cases and both regression-based 
statistical techniques and the comparative case study method – ‘the statistical method writ 
small’ (Hall, 2003) – require variation across cases for explanation. To provide more 
evidence for this: Frendreis article on the most similar system design (mssd) and the most 
different system design (mdsd) has the title: ‘Explanation of Variation and Detection of 
Covariation. The Purpose and Logic of Comparative Analysis’ (1983); and Peter’s widely 
used textbook Comparative Politics. Theory and Method repeats several times the what 
he calls ‘fundamental litany for social research’ (Peters, 1998: 30). ‘Maximize 
experimental variance, minimize error variance, and control extraneous variance’, with 
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maximizing experimental variance meaning maximizing variation in the dependent 
variable’ (ibid.).  
 
HOW TO STUDY SIMILARITIES SCIENTIFICALLY? 
Caramani elaborates on a number of ways to study similarities scientifically. Cross-
temporal comparison is one of them. Also Van Kersbergen alludes to this option. The 
idea is that we can research how countries have ended up with a similar phenomenon by 
tapping into longitudinal differences on the path toward this outcome (Caramani ms. p. 
15-16; Van Kersbergen   ms p. 11). I do agree that this is a promising venue from the 
perspective that scientific explanations demands variation across cases. It resembles to 
some extent the experimental logic of research as it allows for (several) pre- and post test 
‘measurements’ and it controls for all potentially confounding variables that do not 
change over time, although it does not include a control group (see Cook and Campbell, 
1979; Gerring, 2007: 160-164; Lieberman, 2001). I am more skeptical about the other 
alternative Caramani develops, the mdsd. In my reading of this design, the value of the 
key independent variable does not vary across cases (see for instance Freindreis, 1983: 
261; Landman, 2000: 30; Skocpol and Somers, 1980: 184).  I cannot see how this can be 
squared with Caramani’s view that scientific explanation demands variation.2  
 
COMPARATIVE POLITICS AS A METHOD VERSUS NATIONAL POLITICAL 
SYSTEMS AS SUBSTANTIVE FOCUS  
While thus far I am largely in line with what both authors say, I now arrive at a point of 
fundamental disagreement. I do not agree that variation between (observed) cases is the 
only route to scientific explanation. I do believe that there is an alternative which 
presupposes, however, that we make a difference between comparative politics 
(comparing countries) as a method and comparative politics a discipline (or sub-
discipline) with a substantive focus on national political systems. This difference is not 
made by the two authors, although at one point Caramani writes about the need to 
understand current developments in world politics (my italics), which could be read as 
the collection of national political systems as a substantive focus.3  
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VARIATION BETWEEN CASES IS NOT NECESSARY FOR SCIENTIFIC 
EXPLANATION 
Making a difference between method and substance helps to identify an alternative to the 
view that scientific explanations require variation across cases. As said, Caramani relates 
his argument to the experimental ideal that comparative politics seek to approximate by 
quasi-experiments, statistical control or methods like the most similar systems design. 
However, it is telling that one of the most influential methodologists working on 
experimental and quasi-experimental designs, Donald Campbell, states that ‘the  core of 
the scientific method is not experimentation per se but rather the strategy connoted by the 
phrase ‘ plausible rival hypotheses’’ (Campbell, 2003: ix). He explains that this strategy 
implies that one starts with hypotheses and seeks to establish to what extent the 
observable implications of these hypotheses fit empirical observations. In the same vein, 
the comparativist Rogowski has critizised King, Keohane and Verba’s Designing Social 
Inquiry (1994), which represents the mainstream statistical principles of research. 
Rogowski argues that scientific explanation does not only involve the empirical test of 
hypotheses, but first of all the development of a theoretical model and secondly, ‘teasing 
out the deductive implications of that model, focusing particularly on the implications 
that seem a priori least plausible’ (Rogowski, 2004: 73).  
 
 
STUDYING SIMILARITIES BY CONGRUENCE ANALYSIS  
 [Key Quote 1 about here] 
According to this theory-oriented approach, countries (cases, data) are not compared with 
each other but compared with (rival) theoretical expectations. Therefore variation across 
cases is not necessary for scientific explanation. Crucial is the degree of fit (match, 
congruity) between theoretical expectations and empirical observations. An explanation 
is valid if the implications of a proposed theory fit the data and the implications of rival 
theories do not fit the data. It does not matter a priori whether these implications and 
observations concern – from a cross-national perspective – similarities or differences.  
This approach has been labeled congruence analysis (Blatter and Blume 2008a and 
2008b; George and Bennett 2005, see also Haverland, 2006, 2007).4 It is quite a common 
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approach in International Relations, where the problem of ‘n=1’ is notorious and where 
scientific progress develops to some extent along ‘great theoretical debates’, e.g. 
Neoliberalism versus Neorealism or Constructivism versus Rationalism.  
An example of congruence analysis that concerns the working of national political 
systems is Allison’s Essence of Decision (1971), probably the most influential study in 
government decision making. It is a single case study: the Cuban Missile Crisis, hence 
there is by definition no variation across cases. Allison develops three theoretical models, 
deduces propositions about observable implications, and investigates to what extent the 
observable implications match the empirical reality.5  
It is important to note that this approach is not only feasible for case study research. 
It can be used for many countries where each country constitutes a case and for each case 
a single observation is made.  If the assumption of unit homogeneity is satisfied, that is 
that all observations concern the same unit of analysis, the degree of fit between 
prediction and observations can be can be statistically analysed. An example that is close 
to the substantive interest of comparative politics concerns the research project The 
European Union Decides (Thomson et al., 2006) in which predictions from seven 
decision-making models were tested against 162 controversial items of 66 Commission 
proposals for EU legislation (see also Achen, 2006; Blatter and Blume, 2008b: 328-330).  
With regard to case study research it should be mentioned that one should generally 
strive for more than one observation per case (one case – multiple observations). In other 
words cross-case analysis should be accompanied with within-case analysis where 
multiple implications from theories – for different units of analysis – are compared with 
the empirical evidence (see Gerring, 2007). Typically a theory is not so strong that it 
allows for a singular unique, precise and certain prediction. Therefore it is better to arrive 
at a pattern of predictions. Such prediction can concern for instance the sort of actors 
acting, their motivation, or the time, timing and sequence of events. 
In short: whether looking at a large number of cases or a small number of cases, this 
approach implies that if scholars are interested in the puzzle of why a phenomena 
happens everywhere at the same time, they should start with developing a theoretical 
model and then derive observable implications of that model. If the model implies the 
occurrence of the same phenomena in a variety of countries, whereas (all) other theories 
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would expect variation, than the similarities across countries are a virtue rather than a 
vice for scientific explanation. 
 
CONCLUSION: EXPANDING THE TOOLKIT FOR STUDYING SIMILARITIES 
My advocacy for congruence analysis should not imply that I am dismissive of 
approaches that are informed by explanation based on variation. In particular if the 
phenomenon is characterized by growing similarities across countries and our theoretical 
understanding of the phenomenon is not yet very advanced, a cross-temporal design is 
promising. However, if cross-temporal comparisons are not feasible, scholars should turn 
to congruence analysis as an alternative route to cope with the challenge of scientifically 
explaining developments in world politics that manifest themselves in similarities across 
countries. 
 
 
Notes 
1 In fact, almost all of my own research is informed by puzzles of variation.  
 
2 Perhaps Przeworski and Teune’s two level version of the mdsd get around this (1970). 
But in comparative politics, in particular in small ‘n’, the mdsd is used on one level of 
analysis only.  
 
3 Empirically, the focus on national political systems distinguish this empirical sub-
discipline of political science from its counterpart, international relations. 
 
4 Yin calls this ‘mattern matching’ (Yin, 2003)  
 
5 To be sure, Allison splits the Cuban Missile Crisis into three decisions. The point here, 
however, is that these three decisions are not taken as three cases that are compared with 
each other following for instance a most similar system design. Rather, for each of the 
three decisions observable implications of the three models are compared with empirical 
reality.  
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Rogowski runs through a number of very influential studies in comparative politics that 
show no variation in the dependent variable, including the single case study on the 
Netherlands by Lijphart (1968) and Katzenstein’s study of small states all having the 
same outcome, economic success (1985). 
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